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   In hard red spring (HRS) wheat, the two GM traits nearest to commercialization are 
fusarium resistant wheat (FRW) from Syngenta and Roundup Ready® wheat (RRW).  Monsanto 
announced that it has deferred the commercialization of RRW until issues of market acceptance 
are alleviated.  Monsanto acknowledged that it might reconsider its position if another 
agbiotechnology firm enters the GM wheat market. 
 
  A Cournot quantity competition model was developed to determine the equilibrium 
quantities of conventional pesticide and agbiotechnology firms.  The Cournot model was used 
because firms that must make production decisions ahead of the selling period, and firms with 
extensive research and development costs are not able to aggressively set prices.  Rather, the 
conventional and agbiotechnology firms determine Nash equilibrium quantities and then 
determine a market clearing price for their respective products.  The agbiotechnology firm 
determined a profit maximizing technology fee ($/acre) for its GM trait.  The market with 
conventional wheat only was compared to the market with conventional and GM wheat varieties 
to determine the price decreases of the conventional pesticide as a result of the GM trait 
introduction.  Changes in farmer surplus, tech firm payoffs, and sector welfare were also 
analyzed. 
 
  Using the actual number of firms with conventional herbicides labeled for use on HRS 
wheat in North Dakota and marginal production costs ranging from one to three dollars, 
introduction of RRW would cause a 20-25% price decrease for conventional herbicides.  
Similarly, four firms produce conventional fungicides labeled for the suppression of FHB in 
HRS wheat.  This value, combined with per acre marginal production costs ranging from one to 
three dollars, would likely cause a 19-22% price decrease for conventional fungicides, post 
introduction of GM FRW. 
 
  Several implications arise from these results.  First, adoption of a new GM wheat 
variety may not be as high as expected due to likely concurrent price decreases of conventional 
pesticides.  The price decrease leads to a lower production cost of conventional varieties, and 
some farmers who would likely adopt the GM variety, if there were no price decrease, do not 
adopt because of the lower cost of conventional production.  This price decrease must be 
included in the determination of potential adoption rates by agbiotechnology firms in their 
pricing decisions.  Second, the release of a GM wheat variety results in an increase in surplus for 
all types of wheat farmers (GM adopters, conventional pesticide adopters, and no technology 
adopters).  GM adopters benefit because of the release of the GM variety.  Conventional 
pesticide adopters benefit due to the price decreases of the conventional pesticides.  Farmers who 
did not adopt any technology prior to the release of GM wheat may adopt the conventional 
pesticide because of the lower cost.  Third, the release of a GM wheat variety would result in 
slightly lower payoffs for conventional pesticide producing firms but higher payoffs for 
agbiotechnology firms.  Overall, surplus to farmers and conventional and agbiotechnology firms 
increases due to the release of a GM wheat variety. 
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  Development of GM wheat has not progressed as quickly as other crops.  Contributing 
factors include a combination of complex genetics, market size relative to other crops, exports 
are of greater relative importance compared to other crops, import country regulations, and 
competition among exporting countries would be affected by the need for dramatic changes in 
the marketing systems to comply with identity preservation needs (Wilson et al., 2003).  
However, several forms of GM wheat are currently being developed.  At the forefront in North 
America are Roundup Ready® (RRW) by Monsanto (which has since been deferred), fusarium 
resistant (FRW) by Syngenta, and drought tolerance (Wilson et al., 2003).  These are input traits 
because the producer directly realizes the benefits.  Introduction of GM traits would likely have 
the impact of reducing prices of competing conventional technologies.  
 
  Wheat competes with weeds for moisture, nutrients, and sunlight.  Conventional 
chemicals are used to kill or stunt weeds and allow the wheat plant to compete and survive, but 
are limited to specific weeds which may require use of herbicide mixtures.  Combinations of 
hard-to-kill weeds may limit the farmer to target certain weeds and allow others to remain.  
These factors, combined with the possibility of multiple applications of chemicals, affect 
farmers’ demand for the Ready® technology in wheat.  Roundup® herbicide provides superior 
control of a broad spectrum of weeds, thus reducing the need for several herbicides and widening 
the farmer’s application window.  Monsanto, however, realigned its research portfolio and 
decided to defer commercialization of Roundup Ready® wheat (RRW).  Reasons for the 
deferment include the decline in spring wheat acreage in the United States, a lack of widespread 
need for superior weed control in the wheat market, and the success of other traits in Monsanto’s 
research portfolio (Monsanto, 2004). 
 
  Another input trait that may be highly sought by farmers is fusarium resistance in 
wheat.  Fusarium head blight (FHB) is a fungus disease that can occur on all small grain crops, 
but is most commonly seen in North Dakota on spring wheat, durum, and barley (McMullen and 
Stack, 1999).  Some conventional varieties are labeled “moderately resistant” to FHB, such as 
Alsen from North Dakota State University (Ranson and Sorenson, 2003).  Although Alsen is a 
conventional variety, it does not provide total prevention of FHB infestation.  Currently, most 
farmers use a fungicide (e.g., Folicur
®-Bayer) to reduce the susceptibility of the plant to the 
disease.  This fungicide is typically applied at the onset of flowering.  However, the window of 
application is small and for this reason fungicides are not 100% effective.  Besides yield 
reduction, FHB causes reduction in quality resulting in price discounts and quality concerns 
shared by elevators, food processors, as well as consumers.  Fusarium resistant technology would 
eliminate risks related to fungicide application and quality concerns related to this disease. 
 
  Although adoption of GM grains has increased significantly over the past seven years, 
not all farmers benefit equally resulting in a “significant heterogeneity of farmers’ economic 
gains linked to the adoption of GM seed” (Lemarie and Marette, 2003).  Differing plant 
protection problems and greater profits from using conventional chemical pesticides are two of t 
________________________ 
* Huso is former graduate research assistant and Wilson is professor in the Department of Agribusiness and Applied 
Economics at North Dakota State University, Fargo 
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the major reasons that the ceiling of expected adoption and diffusion of GM seeds will be less  
than 100%.  The release of RR soybean in 1996 resulted in a 40% price decrease of two major 
herbicides, Chlorimuron and Imazethapyr (Gianessi and Carpenter, 2000).  This price reduction  
may have also limited the level of adoption of RR soybeans and the economic benefits associated 
with the RR technology (Lemarie and Marette, 2003).   
 
  Decisions on farmer adoption depend on prospective benefits and costs associated with 
growing the GM crop variety versus conventional technology.  If prices of competing 
technologies for the GM variety decline, farmers who would otherwise consider planting the GM 
variety may continue using conventional technologies because of the lower input cost.  Such a 
price decline would also affect the pricing of the new GM technology.     
 
The objective of this paper is to analyze prospective changes in prices of competing 
technologies of GM wheat varieties (particularly FRW and RRW), if and when the trait is 
introduced, combined with the determination of conditions under which a farmer would adopt a 
particular GM wheat trait.  The model builds on that used by Lemarie and Marette (2003), which 
incorporates prices of substitutes in the adoption of a new technology.  Stochastic simulation is 
used to implement random variables into the models representing the uncertain outcomes 
associated with an unreleased product.  Random values associated with the release of GM wheat 
include yield, quality, input costs, and market acceptance.  Simulation results reflect the 
prospective range of outcomes without the availability of historical data. 
 
Background 
This section summarizes the status and development of GM crops and previous 
literature associated with input pricing models and competition. 
 
GM Traits in the Pipeline 
  Commercially available GM crops have traits that are input-oriented and these provide 
direct benefits to farmers in the form of yield increases, cost savings, or ease of production.  In 
corn, permits were granted for the testing of biotech crops with input-oriented traits that are yield 
increasing, drought and cold tolerant, fusarium resistant, and herbicide tolerant.  Testing of 
biotech corn with output-oriented traits include seed color altered, starch metabolism altered, 
protein altered, and lysine level increased.  In soybean, new traits include yield increasing, fungal 
resistant, herbicide tolerant, insect resistant, protein altered, oil profile altered, and fatty acid 
level altered.  In cotton, traits being tested include fiber quality altered, fungal resistant, and 
herbicide resistant (USDA APHIS, n.d.). 
 
  Although no GM wheat varieties are currently available, research and development of 
GM traits is moving forward.  Private firms and public institutions are working to develop 
different GM traits in wheat.  Monsanto and Syngenta are leading the way in GM wheat trait 
development with herbicide tolerant wheat (RRW-Monsanto) and GM fusarium resistant wheat 
(FRW-Syngenta) (Wilson et al., 2003).  In addition, a number of public institutions are working 
on drought tolerance. 
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Though RRW has been developed, its commercialization has been deferred.  This was 
due to “portfolio review and dialogue with wheat industry leaders,” and that Monsanto has 
realized that opportunities associated with RRW are “less attractive relative to Monsanto’s other 
commercial priorities” (Monsanto, 2004, para. 2).   Monsanto chose to wait until other GM 
wheat varieties are introduced before continuing commercialization, which is estimated to 
happen in the next four to eight years (Pratt, 2004).  GM FRW is also expected to be near 
commercialization in the latter part of this decade.  Syngenta’s anticipated launch of GM FRW 
was aggressively set for 2007 (Syngenta, 2004). Another, more conservative estimate from 
Syngenta indicates that GM FRW may be ready for the market in seven years (Pates, 2004).  
Besides RRW and GM FRW, other GM wheat traits are being developed.  Traits that are 
currently being field tested include those with altered agronomic properties such as drought 
tolerance, cold tolerance, and yield increases.  Other traits include fungal resistance (being tested 
by ARS, Syngenta, and University of Minnesota), herbicide tolerance (ARS and Monsanto), 
virus resistance (University of Idaho), and a marker gene (Montana State University).  GM traits 
that constitute product quality alterations include digestibility improvement (Applied Phytologics 
and Ventria Bioscience), starch metabolism altered (Biogemma), improved bread making 
characteristics (Montana State), and several others (USDA APHIS, n.d.).  
 
 
Impacts of GM Crops on Conventional Pesticides 
 
  The global market for conventional agrochemical products was valued at $2.8 billion in 
2000.  The most significant component of the market was herbicides (51%), followed by 
insecticides (26%) and fungicides (20%).  The largest regional market for agrochemicals was 
North America (31%), followed by East Asia (24%), Western Europe (20%), and Latin America 
(18%) (McDougall and Phillips, 2003).  The herbicide sector grew at an average rate of 2.5% per 
year over the period of 1980 to 1999, but the value fell by 4.8% during 1999, mainly because of 
the increase in adoption of herbicide tolerant crops (McDougall and Phillips, 2003).  The largest 
herbicide class, in terms of value, is amino acids.  Within amino acids, glyphosate is by far the 
most significant chemical, with 2000 sales totaling over $3.12 billion.  From 1995 to 2000, the 
sales of most classes of herbicides decreased from 0.3% to 11.6%.  Some classes increased in 
sales at a small value.  The amino acid class has seen a sales increase of 14% from 1995 to 2000.  
This increase in sales is mainly due to the rapid expansion of the overall non-selective herbicide 
market.  Two factors contributing to this market are the increase in adoption of conservation 
tillage practices and the increase in acreage of crops that have been genetically modified to be 
tolerant to key members of the amino acid group (McDougall and Phillips, 2003).  The economic 
effects of GM crops have been studied extensively.  These effects range from yield, profits, and 
chemical usage to environmental effects and labor cost savings.  Specifically, the impact of the 
adoption of GM crops on the use of conventional pesticides has been examined for each 
commercialized GM crop (Carpenter and Gianessi, 2003).   
 
  Each of the four commercially available GM crops has had some sort of impact on the 
agrochemical market.  The effect of these GM varieties on pesticide use was examined by 
Carpenter and Gianessi (2003).  Between 1995 and 2000, the percentage of total corn acres 
treated for four insecticides targeted at the European corn borer (ECB) decreased marginally.  
However, the use of a newly introduced insecticide, in 1996, increased by 2% over the same time 
period.  Carpenter and Gianessi suggest several possible explanations for the decrease in use of 
insecticides for ECB.  One possible explanation is the introduction of Bt corn varieties and the 
resulting reduced need for insecticides targeted at the ECB.  Another possible reason for the  
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slight decrease in insecticide use from 1995 to 2000 is the relatively light ECB infestations 
during certain years in the interval.  Other reasons include the introduction of new insecticides 
and a decline in insecticide treatments targeted at pests other than the ECB (Carpenter and 
Gianessi, 2003). 
 
  Cotton is a major pesticide market in the US.  The long growing season, higher pest 
pressure, and high value of the crop require intensive pest management.  Cotton growers spend 
approximately $347 million for insecticides and apply approximately 20 million pounds of active 
ingredient each year.  Cotton growers also spend approximately $320 million for herbicides and 
apply approximately 30 million pounds of active ingredient each year.  The use of insecticides on 
cotton acres in six major cotton producing states decreased by approximately 3.1 million pounds 
of active ingredient from 1995 to 2000, a decline of 16%.  This decline is believed to be directly 
linked to the introduction of Bt cotton varieties, but it must also be noted that other factors, such 
as differences in pest pressure from year to year, may also have caused some decline in 
insecticide use (Carpenter and Gianessi, 2003).   
 
  Two forms of herbicide tolerant cotton became available in the mid-1990s.  These are 
BXN cotton (which is resistant to the broadleaf herbicide bromoxynil) and Roundup Ready® 
(which is resistant to the non-selective herbicide glyphosate).  The percentage of cotton acres 
treated with the most commonly used herbicides has declined from 1997 to 2000 (Carpenter and 
Gianessi, 2003).  For example, acres treated with trifluralin decreased by 18%, fluometuron 
decreased by 25%, and MSMA decreased by 17%.  Over this same time period, the number of 
acres treated with glyphosate increased by 43%, and those treated with bromoxynil increased by 
5% (Carpenter and Gianessi, 2003).   
 
  The case of RR soybeans provides insight to the possible price impacts involved with 
RR wheat.  Adoption of the herbicide tolerant soybeans caused price decreases in conventional 
herbicides for soybeans since the commercial release of GM soybeans in 1996.  However, this is 
not indicative of all herbicide tolerant varieties.  It must be noted that herbicide tolerant corn had 
minimal effect on the overall pesticide market because of its limited adoption.   
 
  Adoption of RR soybeans has been rapid since 1996, reaching a level of 81% of total 
U.S. soybean acres in 2003.  Reasons for farmers’ aggressive adoption range from higher yield, 
to improved weed control without crop injury, to reduced management time spent to supervise 
production (Gianessi and Carpenter, 2000; Fernandez-Cornejo and Hendricks, 2003).  From 
1995 to 2000, the percentage of U.S. soybean acres treated for each herbicide class, besides 
glyphosate, declined (Carpenter and Gianessi, 2003).  In some cases, the decline was significant.  
Imazethapyr use decreased by 32%, trifluralin use decreased by 16%, and chlorimuron use 
decreased by 6%.  The use of glyphosate increased from 20% of acres in 1995 to 62% of acres in 
2000 (Carpenter and Gianessi, 2003).  Using the 1999 Illinois Agricultural Pest Management 
Handbook from the University of Illinois, Gianessi and Carpenter (2000) found that the per 
pound cost of chlorimuron and imazethapyr declined by 40% to 50% in 1997 and 1998 and the 
price of glyphosate declined by 22% in 1998.  Gianessi and Carpenter (2000) then determined:  
“The result of lower priced Roundup Ready® treatments in comparison with competitive 
herbicides and the lowering of the price for key herbicides including glyphosate meant that 
soybean growers spent significantly less on herbicides in 1998 than in 1995,” (p. 62).  In North 
Dakota, a similar pattern of herbicide price decrease was noted for key herbicides used on 



























































Figure 2.  Approximate Retail Price of Poast® from 1995-2003 in North Dakota.
2 
 
                                                           
1 Pursuit® is a member of the imazethapyr herbicide class that controls many broadleaf weeds.  Pursuit® is a 
registered trademark of BASF Corporation. 
2 Poast® is a member of the sethoxydim herbicide class and is used to control annual grasses.  
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Figure 3.  Approximate Retail Price of Roundup® Original from 1995-2003 in North Dakota.
3 
 
  Diffusion of GM seeds is expected to negatively impact pesticide sales.  Because of this 
competition, prices of synthetic pesticides may decrease (which has also been illustrated).  
Lemarie and Marette (2003) developed the idea that the price decrease of synthetic pesticides 
may lead to an increase in the surplus for farmers who are still using the conventional pesticides.  
For RR soybeans, they (2003) suggest that price reductions in conventional herbicides may have 
limited adoption of RR soybeans and the relative economic benefits derived from such 
technology.  Their model focuses on the relevance of the competition and substitutability 
between conventional pesticides and GM seeds, and the size and distribution of innovation 
impacts in regards to new GM technology adoption.  They examined two competing products:  
conventional seed plus conventional pesticides and GM seed plus corresponding pesticides.  
Market equilibrium was evaluated with and without GM seed and determined that the transfer of 
surplus from pesticide companies to biotechnology companies is important.  They also 
determined that the transfer of surplus from both biotechnology and chemical firms to farmers, 
who benefit from market competition and increased product variation, is important.  
 
  Factors influencing the farmer’s decision to adopt herbicide tolerant soybeans are the 
level of weed infestation, income, and contractual relations with buyers or suppliers (Nadolnyak 
and Sheldon, 2001).  These factors could be applied to choosing a particular GM trait as well.  
Then the decision depends also on the price of the technology.  The more weed infestation an 
agricultural producer faces, the more benefits HT soybeans offer (Nadolnyak and Sheldon, 
2001).  This applies to insects and fungi as well.  It is reasonable to assume that as the level of 
insect infestation increases, the greater the benefits of an insect resistant GM variety, and as the 
probability of fungal disease increases, the greater the benefits of a disease resistant GM variety.  
In choosing a GM trait, the farmer determines the significance of each potential pest and decides 
which to target.  Given the potential problems (weeds, insects, diseases, etc.) that are most likely 
to appear in the field used for production, the farmer chooses which GM variety to plant.   
 
                                                           
3 Roundup® is a member of the glyphosate herbicide class and is a non-selective herbicide.  Roundup is a registered 
trademark of Monsanto.  
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  Determining pest infestation levels and desired traits by farmers does not automatically 
result in adoption of GM traits.  The high price of Bt cotton in Argentina was a significant 
adoption constraint for farmers (Qaim and de Janvry, 2002).  In Argentina, Bt cotton was 
commercially released in 1998.  By 2001, Bt cotton covered only about 5% of the national cotton 
area.  This is not because of low demand for GM varieties, because at the same time, adoption of 
GM soybeans increased to near 100%.  However, unlike GM soybeans, which are not patented in 
Argentina and marketed by different seed companies, Monsanto was granted a national patent 
over Bt cotton technology and owns the sole provider of Bt seeds.  Farmers in Argentina paid 
$103 U.S. per hectare for Bt cotton seeds, which is more than four times the price of 
conventional varieties (Qaim and de Janvry, 2002).  Qaim and de Janvry (2002) determined that 
both the farmer and seed producer surplus would increase with a decrease in the price of the 
seed, thus indicating that the price of the GM seed is significant in adoption decisions of farmers. 
 
  Fulton and Giannakas (2001) found that two broad conclusions can be drawn from the 
literature.  First, pricing by seed and chemical companies is strategic; and second, the strategic 
decisions have important impacts on the distribution of the benefits from research and 
development.  Strategic pricing means that prices are actively determined by firms rather than 
exogenously.  Biotechnology firms routinely conduct market research to determine price 
elasticity of demand for a certain new technology which influences the technology price.  
Strategic pricing must closely be linked to sunk costs, because if price is at marginal cost, there 
is little incentive to undertake research and development expenditures (Fulton and Giannakas, 
2001).   
 
Adoption and Diffusion of Genetically Modified Seeds 
 
  GM seeds focusing on insect resistance (IR) and herbicide tolerance (HT), along with 
possible future input-oriented traits such as fungal resistance (FR), are substitutes for 
conventional seeds and some form of conventional pest control.  A farmer could use FR seeds as 
a direct substitute to the combination of conventional seed varieties and fungicide.  Therefore, 
when disease pressures are high enough, farmers would substitute fungicide applications with the 
adoption of FR seed varieties.  However, if certain disease pressures are not controlled by the FR 
seed variety, additional fungicide applications may be necessary.  In this case, the substitution 
would occur between the bundle [FR seed + (additional fungicide – if necessary)] and the 
conventional bundle [conventional seed + fungicide] (Lemarie and Marette, 2003).  This 
substitution pattern is shown in Figure 4. 
 
  Seeds that are genetically modified to express the HT trait allow farmers to apply non-
selective herbicides (or, burndown herbicides, e.g., glyphosate and glufosinate) through much of 
the crop’s growth cycle.  Consequently, conventional post-emergent herbicides can be 
substituted with burndown herbicides.  The HT seed is a complement to the burndown herbicide, 
and the bundle [HT seed + burndown herbicide] is a substitute to the conventional bundle 
[conventional seed + post-emergent herbicide] (Lemarie and Marette, 2003).  This substitution 
pattern is shown in Figure 5.  
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Figure 4.  Substitution Pattern of the GM FRW Case.   







Figure 5.  Substitution Pattern in the HT Case. 




Price Impacts of GM Adoption on Competing Inputs 
  This section develops a model to analyze the impacts of the introduction of a GM trait 
on input prices.  Variables and relationships are defined to determine the level of impacts and 
factors that affect the outcome.  The theoretical model builds upon that of Lemarie and Marette 
(2003) which is based on the vertical differentiation model of Mussa and Rosen (1978). 
 
  Adoption of GM seeds not only has an effect on output prices, but also affects prices of 
competing inputs.  Lapan and Moschini (2000) analyze how the innovator’s pricing is affected 
when the adoption of the innovation may change the price of some other input used by final 
producers.  They examine innovation adoption under both exogenous and endogenous input 
prices.  Exogenous input prices result in no production inefficiencies because adoption of the 
technologically superior innovation would be complete.  If input prices were endogenous, the 
monopolist innovator would price the new input such that both new and old inputs would be 
used, leading to “pure production inefficiency” (Lapan and Moschini, 2000).  They use land as 
the competing input, but Lemarie and Marette (2003) argue that the price of land may not be the 
best explanation for the endogeneity of diffusion because its adjustment may be slower 
compared to other input prices.  Incomplete adoption is explained by the heterogeneity of 
farmers and the competition with conventional seed and chemical inputs. 
 
  In a market with only a few sellers, pricing and production strategies of any one firm 
affects industry price and production levels (Besanko et al., 2004).  In the Cournot model, the 
strategic choice of each firm is quantity.  Once firms are committed to production, they set 
whatever price is necessary to clear the market.  Because price depends on the production of both 
firms, the amount that one firm produces depends on how much it expects its competitor to 
produce, and vice versa.  The Cournot model is used in markets where firms make production 
decisions in advance and are committed to selling all of their output.  Because prices adjust more 
quickly than quantities, each firm sets a price that lets it sell all that it produces.  Therefore, each 
firm expects that if a firm lowers its price, it cannot expect to steal customers from its rivals.  
Cournot competitors must allow substantial decreases in revenue in order to expand output.  The 
Cournot equilibrium outcome results in positive profits and a price that exceeds marginal and 
average cost. 
 
  Symeonidis (2003) made several propositions that show the attractiveness of the 
Cournot model when product RandD is extensive.  A key proposition made is that profits net of 
RandD costs are higher under quantity competition than price competition.  In an industry with 
product RandD, there are circumstances where both consumer surplus and firms’ profits are 
higher in the Cournot equilibrium than in the Bertrand equilibrium.   
 
 
The Model for Price Impacts 
 
  For fusarium head blight control, fungicide spray or GM FRW seeds are used.  For 
weed control, conventional post-emergent herbicides or the bundle RRW seed plus burndown 
herbicides are used.  For simplicity, it is assumed that only one synthetic pesticide product is 
used to solve a plant protection problem, eliminating possible combinations of pesticides.  Also, 




 Alternative  technology  choices are indexed by i; i=0 referring to the conventional plant 
protection solution and i=1 referring to the plant protection solution based on the use of GM 
seed.  Technology choice i is supplied by ni firm(s) which compete(s) on quantity.  The marginal 
production cost of this technology is ci and the price (which is determined after the level of 
competition) is pi (both ci and pi are expressed in $/lb).  The conventional input and the GM 
input are both produced with a constant unit cost (c0 = c1).  This assumption aids in explicitly 
modeling innovations that take the form of vertically differentiated inputs (e.g., a more 
productive seed variety).  Excluding costs of research and development, production costs of the 
conventional and GM inputs are assumed to be the same (Lapan and Moschini, 2000). 
 
  In the HT case, the farmer pays both the price of the burndown herbicide (p1) and the 
price premium of the GM seed (pL).  In the FR case, the farmer pays the GM seed premium (pL) 
only. The price premium (pL) is decided by the agbiotechnology firm, which is assumed to have 
a monopoly position with respect to the particular GM trait.  The use of GM seed on one acre 
leads to a profit increase of pL for the biotechnology company. 
 
  The technical efficiency (or, production efficiency) for technology choice i is xi, with 
x1>x0.  The farmer’s choice between the different plant protection solutions is made on a per acre 
basis.  Farmers are assumed heterogeneous, and each has a willingness-to-pay equal to θxi for 
technology choice i, where θ represents individual pesticide demand or the intensity of 
production problems for each farmer.  θ is assumed uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.  In 
the HT case, a farmer with highly intensive weed pressures corresponds to a θ close to 1, while 
those with less weed pressure correspond to a θ close to 0.  In the FR case, a farmer with a wheat 
crop that is highly susceptible to fusarium head blight corresponds to a θ close to 1, while those 
with less susceptibility to the disease correspond to a θ close to 0.  Use of technology choice i (at 
the required per acre dosage of each technology choice, ai) provides an indirect utility of ui.  The 








L p p a x u
p a x u
1 1 1 1





  The farmer selects the technology with the highest indirect utility (i.e., adopt GM if u1 > 
u0).  If the indirect utility for all choices is negative for a given θ, then no product is purchased.  
The total number of farmers by acreage is denoted by N.  In period 1, the biotechnology firm 
determines the license price; and in period 2, chemical and GM-chemical bundle sellers 
determine the quantities they produce (Cournot competition).  In period 3, farmers determine 
various quantities of these inputs to purchase. 
 
  Market equilibrium with one product: conventional protection only.  Market 
equilibrium is determined with conventional plant protection only and also with introduction of 
GM products to demonstrate the impacts of the GM traits. Without introduction of GM seeds, 
only conventional chemical pesticides (i.e., technology choice 0) exist.  A farmer who is 
indifferent between buying technology choice 0 and buying nothing is identified by the 
preference parameter θ ˆ.  All farmers with  θ θ ˆ >  purchase technology choice 0.  As θ is 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, the total demand for conventional herbicides used is
4 
                                                           
4 Derivation of the market equilibrium conditions are shown in detail in Appendix A. Computations were done using 
Mathematica 3.0.  
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  ) ˆ 1 ( 0 0 θ − = Na Q . (2) 






= θ , (3) 
and substituting this expression into the demand function and solving for the inverse demand 
function yields 
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The profit for seller k is  
  k k q c Q p 0 0 0 0 0 ) ) ( ( − = π . (5) 
To determine the profit maximizing quantity for seller k, the following first-order condition must 
be met: 
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  Under a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium, all sellers of the conventional 
technology have the same production quantity of technology choice 0,  j k q q 0 0 =  for any j.  
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0 Q  into the inverse demand function and solving for the equilibrium price (
*
0 p ) 
gives  
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The farmers’ surplus, 
*
0 s , in the one product case is 
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and is comprised of three main elements.  N is the total number of acres for wheat production.  
The first bracketed term is the indirect utility of a farmer with θ = 1, or the highest need for 
technology choice 0.  The second bracketed term is the indirect utility of a farmer with  θ θ ˆ = , or 
the lowest level of adoption for technology choice 0.  The difference between the two terms is 
the surplus per acre for farmers who adopt technology choice 0.  Multiplying by N gives total 






0 0 s n W + = π . (15) 
 
  Market equilibrium with two products: conventional and GM seeds.  With two 
competing plant protection solutions, the farmers’ input demand function changes.  The price for 
selecting GM seeds that do not require a complementary pesticide is  L p  and the price of a GM-
chemical combination is  1 p pL + .  A farmer who is indifferent (i.e., receives the same utility) 
between the technology choices 0 and 1 is denoted by θ
~
.  Technology choice 1 is used by a 
farmer with  θ θ
~
> , while technology choice 0 is used by the farmer with θ such that  θ θ θ
~ ˆ < < .  




  ( ) θ θ ˆ ~
0 0 − = Na Q  and  (16) 
  ( ) θ
~
1 1 1 − = Na Q . (17) 
Since θ
~




0 0 1 1 ~
x x
p a p p a L
−
− +
= θ . (18) 
Demand functions for the two technology choices are 
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L  and  (19) 
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p a p p a
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L . (20) 
Equation 19 is the difference between θ
~
 and θ ˆ, which is the difference in demand per 
acre for technology choice 0.  Multiplying by the amount applied per acre ( 0 a ) and the total 
number of acres (N) gives total demand for technology choice 0.  Equation 20 is the difference 
between 1 and θ
~
, representing those farmers with the greatest need for technology choice 1.  
Multiplying by  1 a  and N gives the total demand for technology choice 1. 
 
Simultaneously solving the two technology choice demand functions for  0 p  and  1 p , the 
inverse demand functions are 




















p Q Q p L  and  (21) 
























1 0 1 1 , , . (22) 
Equation 21 shows that the price for technology choice 0,  0 p , is a function of demand for 
technology choice 0 , 0 Q , demand for technology choice 1 , 1 Q , and the license price for 
technology choice 1,  L p  (because both  0 Q  and  1 Q  are functions of  L p ).  The inverse demand 
function for technology choice 1 shows that the price for technology choice 1,  1 p , is also a 
function of  0 Q ,  1 Q , and  L p .  Since  1 p  represents only the price for the complementary 
herbicide, the license price for the GM trait ( L p ) must be subtracted to determine the price of the 
herbicide only.   
 
Substituting the inverse demand functions in the profit function and maximizing profit for 
the  0 n  and  1 n  sellers under a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium leads to the following first-
order conditions: 































 and  (23) 
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The first-order conditions are solved to obtain equilibrium quantities for sellers of each 
technology choice.  These quantities can then be used to determine the equilibrium prices: 
 
  () () ( ) ( )
() () () 1 1
1
1 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 *
0 + + + −
− + + + +
=
n n x n n x a
n n c a p a c a x x n n x c a
p p
L
L  and  (25) 
() () ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () 1 1
1
1 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 *
1 + + + −
+ − − + − + − +
=
n n x n n x a
n n x n x x c n x p a n x n x n c a x x
p p
L
L . (26) 
  Equation 25 is the equilibrium price of technology choice 0, and Equation 26 is the 
equilibrium price of the complementary pesticide needed in technology choice 1.  If two 
companies supply technology choice 1 ( 2 1 = n ), one firm is the agbiotechnology firm providing 
the GM trait while selling the complementary pesticide, and the other only sells a competitive 
complementary pesticide.  The firm that sells only the complementary pesticide does not gain 
profit from the GM trait itself, but only from the sale of the complementary pesticide. 
 
  The price of technology choice 0 before and after the introduction of the new 
technology is compared by Equations 11 and 25, respectively.  Factors in Equation 25 that are 
not in Equation 11 are the technical efficiency of technology choice 1 ( ) 1 x , the number of firms 
producing technology choice 1 () 1 n , and the license price for the technology choice 1 () L p .  
Differences in technical efficiency between the two technology choices ( ) 0 1 x x > , an increase in 
the firms producing technology choice 1, and an increasing license price are reasons that 
*
0 p  will 
decrease as the market moves from one technology choice to two technology choices. 
 
Equilibrium prices and quantities determine firm profits: 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ()
() () ()
2
1 0 1 1 0 0 0
2





+ + − +
=
n n x n n x x
n p c a x x n x c a N
p
L
L π  and  (27) 
  () ( )( ) ()
() () ()
2
1 0 1 1 0 0
2





+ + − + − +
=
n n x n n x
n p c a n x n x n c a x Nx
p
L
L π . (28) 
 
Equilibrium quantities, prices, and profits are a function of the license price,  L p , which is 
determined by the agbiotechnology firm.  The agbiotechnology firm gains profit from both the 
sale of complementary pesticides to their GM traits, and from the license price received from the 
sale of GM seeds,  L p .  Therefore, the profit function for the agbiotechnology firm is 




1 1 π π + = .  Profit maximization for the agbiotechnology firm with respect to 
L p  gives the equilibrium license price 
*
L p  in Equations 29, which depends on the number of 
firms providing technology choice 0 ( 0 n ), the number of firms providing technology choice 1 
( 1 n ), and the level of technical efficiency of each technology choice ( 0 x  and  1 x ):   
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( ) () ( )( ) ( )
() () () ()
2
1 1 0 1
2
1 0 0 0 1
2
1 1 0 1
2
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 *
1 1 1 2
2 1 1
n n n x n n x n a
n n n x n n x n c a n x n x n c a x
pL + + − + + − +
+ + − + + − + − + − +
= . (29) 
 
 If  0 n  increases, competition increases and 
*
L p  decreases.  If  1 n  increases, the price of 
the complementary pesticide decreases, resulting in an increase in 
*
L p .  If the difference in 
technical efficiency between the two technology choices decreases, 
*
L p  will decrease because of 
the increased competitiveness between the two technology choices.   
 
  The farmers’ surplus in this case are defined as 








θ θ d u N s  and  (30) 




1 * θ θ d u N s . (31) 








0 0 1 s s n n W B + + + − + = π π π .  Because two technology choices are 
available, sector welfare is now represented by including the firms producing technology choice 
1, as well as those farmers who adopt technology choice 1. 
 
When a complementary pesticide is not required (as in the case of IR and FR), a farmer 
purchasing technology choice 1 pays only the license price,  L p .  Equilibrium quantities, prices, 
profits and surpluses are also different (see footnote 4).  Equilibrium quantities for each 
technology choice are defined as 
 
  ( ) ( ) ()
() () () 1 1
1
1 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 *
0 + + −
+ − +
=
n n x n n x x
n c x x n x c a Na
q  and  (32) 
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1
1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 *
1 + + + −
+ + − + − −
− =
n n x n n x
n c n x n x n c a x Na
q . (33) 
 
Equilibrium prices for each technology choice are 
 
  () ( )
() () () 1 1
1
1 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 *
0 + + + −
− + + +
=
n n x n n x a
n n c a n c x x n n x c a
p  and  (34) 
  () ( )
() () () 1 1
1
1 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
2
1 *
+ + + −
+ + − + − +
=
n n x n n x
n n c n c n x n c a x n n x c n x
pL . (35) 
 
Equations 11 and 34 are the equilibrium price of technology choice 0, 
*
0 p , in the market 
with one technology choice and the market with two technology choices, respectively.  Equation 
34 indicates that after the introduction of the new technology choice, 
*
0 p  is dependent on the 
technical efficiencies of each choice, as well as the number of firms producing each technology 
choice.  As the difference between  1 x  and  0 x  increases ( ) 0 1 x x > , 
*
0 p  in Equation 34 decreases.  
Also, as  0 n  and/or  1 n  increase(s), 
*
0 p  decreases because of increased competition. 
 
The price of technology choice 1 is now only the license price, 
*
L p .  Because the GM trait 
does not require a complementary pesticide and the assumption of monopoly power, the number  
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of firms supplying technology choice 1 ( 1 n ), is one.  Since there are no firms selling 
complementary pesticides, the equilibrium profits to the sellers of technology choice 0 and 
technology choice 1 are 
  ( ) ( ) ()
() () ()
2
1 0 1 1 0 0 0
2







n n x n n x x
n c x x n x c a N
π  and   (36) 
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Total farmer surplus is defined over the ranges of adoption for each technology choice: 








θ θ d u N s , and  (38) 




1 * θ θ d u N s . (39) 








0 0 s s n W B + + + = π π . (40) 
 
Equation 40 differs from sector welfare in the HT case because of the absence of sellers of 
complementary pesticides to the GM trait. 
 
 
Empirical Model Description 
 
  The model is applied to hard red spring wheat (HRS) in North Dakota.  The prospective 
release of fusarium resistant wheat (FRW) and Roundup Ready® wheat (RRW) are scenarios 
used to evaluate the impacts on prices of competing conventional herbicides and fungicides after 
the release of these GM wheat traits.  Players are conventional pesticide producing firms, the 
agbiotechnology firm, incumbent firms producing the pesticide that complements the GM trait, 
and farmers who decide which technologies to adopt.  The agbiotechnology firm determines the 
license price ( L p ), then all sellers of conventional chemicals and/or GM-chemical bundles 
determine quantities (Cournot competition), and finally, farmers determine the quantities of the 
two technology choices to purchase (i.e., adoption). 
 
The model begins with only conventional wheat to determine an equilibrium for 
comparison between input prices to a market with both conventional and GM wheat.  The second 
scenario includes the release of GM FRW along with availability of the conventional variety.  
This GM wheat trait would not require a complementary pesticide, so there are no sellers of 
complementary pesticides to this product.  Farmers choose between purchasing a conventional 
wheat variety and applying a fungicide treatment or a GM FRW variety.  The agbiotechnology 
firm providing the GM FRW trait has a monopoly with respect to that trait and receives profits 
only from the license price for the GM FRW trait.  The third scenario is the market with 
conventional wheat and RR wheat.  RRW requires the application of a glyphosate herbicide.  
The agbiotechnology firm providing the RR trait has a monopoly on that trait and also sells the 
complementary herbicide.  This firm receives profits from both the license price of the seed, and 
the sale of the complementary herbicide.  Other firms that sell the complementary herbicide do 




Data Sources, Distributions, and Assumptions 
 
  Data are used to represent HRSW production in North Dakota in each of the three 
scenarios.  Variables used in the model are described as 
 
  N =  Number of acres annually planted to HRS in U.S.; 
 
  n0 =  Number of firms producing conventional pesticides labeled for use on  
    HRS in ND.  For RRW, this is herbicides; for FRW, this is fungicides; 
 
  n1 =  Number of firms producing the complementary pesticide to the GM variety.
    This is only applicable to RRW.  Also, one of the firms is the provider of the 
  GM  trait.    When  n1 = 1, no sellers of complementary pesticides (i.e. FRW); 
 
  c0 =  Marginal production cost of the conventional pesticide; 
 
  c1 =  Marginal production cost of the GM-complementary pesticide solution; 
 
  x0 =  Technical or production efficiency of the conventional wheat variety; 
 
x1 =    Technical or production efficiency of the GM wheat variety; 
 
  a0 =  Required per acre dosage of the conventional pesticide (assuming no  
  multiple  tank  mixes  are  necessary); 
 
  a1 =  Required per acre dosage of the complementary pesticide; and 
 
  θ =  Idiosyncratic pesticide need for each farmer. 
 
Relationships used in the one product scenario are equations 3, 9, 11, 12, 14, and 15; and those 
used in the conventional plus GM FRW scenario are equations 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, and 
40.  Finally, relationships in the conventional plus RRW scenario are equations 18, 25, 26, 27, 
28, 29, 30, and 31. 
 
  Table 1 provides a summary of the data sources.  Distributions for yield variables were 
determined using Bestfit, a distribution estimation procedure in @RISK (Palisade Corporation, 
2000).  The idiosyncratic pesticide need for each farmer (θ) is assumed to be uniformly 
distributed on the interval 0 to 1.  This pesticide need can be interpreted as the adoption level for 
each product and is a function of input prices, application rates, and technical efficiencies of each 
product.  It is unique to each product type and each scenario, therefore, the level of θ for 
conventional wheat is not the same under both the FRW and the RRW scenarios.  Values of the 
discrete model parameters are summarized in Table 2.  Table 3 summarizes the random variable 
distributions and Table 4 summarizes the base case assumptions.  Base case yields are taken 










HRSW Acreage in U.S.  USDA  NASS (2004) 
 
Number of herbicide producing firms  Zollinger (2004) 
 
Number of fungicide producing firms  McMullen and Bradley (2004) 
 
Conventional Wheat Yield – ND CRD 3  USDA NASS (2004) 
 
Roundup Ready® Wheat Yield Benefit  Blackshaw and Harker (2002) 
 
Fusarium Resistant Wheat Yield Benefit 
 
Nganje et al. (2001) 
Pesticide application rates (Conv and GM)  Zollinger (2004) 








Base Case Value 
U.S. HRSW Acres 
 
N = 15.212 million 
Marginal Production Cost 
 
c0 = c1 = 0 
Required per acre dosage 
 
a0 = a1 = 1 
Tech Choice 0 firms  
 
1, 2 






Table 3.  Random Variable Distributions – Base Case 
Variable 
Distribu
tion  Mean 
Std. 







Logistic 35.81  4.14  NA  NA  -0.85  with 
FHB loss 
 
Yield Increase RR Wheat  Uniform  NA  NA  NA 
 
(.11, .14)  Insignificant 
 
 











Farmer Pesticide Need 
 
Uniform NA  NA  NA  (0,  1)  NA  
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N   15.212 million acres  Average HRSW annual 
planting acreage in U.S. 
n0   1 or 2  Representing monopoly and 
competition among 
conventional pesticide firms 
n1   1 or 2  If 1, FRW  agbiotech firm; if 
2, RRW firm plus 
competitive herbicide firm 
c0  0  Assumption for simplicity.  
No marginal cost to produce.
c1  0  Assumed no additional cost 
to produce GM seed. 
x0 (yield used as efficiency)  Mean = 35.81 bu/acre 
St. Dev. = 4.14 bu/acre 
Reflective of ND CRD-3 
HRSW yield over period 
1990-2003 
x1 (yield in scenario 2-FR)  1.5-35.9% benefit over 
conventional yield 
Yield loss due to FHB in 
ND CRD-3 over period 
1993-2000 
x1 (yield in scenario 3-RR)  11-14% benefit over 
conventional yield 
Monsanto field trials across 
various geographic regions 
a0   1  Assumption for simplicity 
 
a1   1  Same as above 
 
θ  U[0,1]  Farmers with low WTP for 




Total HRS acres, marginal cost of production, required per acre dosage, and the number 
of firms selling conventional or complementary pesticides plus GM technology were assigned 
values rather than simulated.  In the base case, it was assumed that the marginal cost of 
production of both GM and conventional varieties is zero.  A large portion of the total cost 
associated with a GM trait is fixed due to extensive research and development over many years, 
and data do not exist on the value of the marginal cost of production and distribution of a GM 
seed trait.  Thus, following Lemarie and Marette (2003), the base case assumes this value to be 
nil.  However, it is recognized that the marginal cost of production is not nil and sensitivities are 
conducted to illustrate the impact of increasing marginal cost of production.  
 
It is assumed that two firms represent a competitive market.  Because of the assumption 
of no tank mixed pesticides, the use of one or two technology providing firms in the model 
simplifies the impacts of increased competition in the respective industry and also adds 
consistency to the analysis.  Sensitivities were conducted on the number of firms to more 
critically detail the impacts of increased competition.  Conventional grass and broadleaf control 
herbicides that are labeled for use in North Dakota are produced by eleven different firms.  Nine 
firms produce a glyphosate herbicide that is labeled for use in North Dakota (i.e., on burndown,  
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HT soybeans, HT corn, pre-harvest for wheat, etc.).  Four firms produce fungicides that are 
labeled for the suppression of FHB in HRS in North Dakota (McMullen and Bradley, 2004).  For 
simplicity in the base case, one producing firm denotes a monopoly with respect to that product, 
and two producing firm indicates competition among firms.  Sensitivities were conducted to 
evaluate the effects of more competitors on prices, adoption, profits, and welfare.   
 
  The analytic model is a set of mathematical relationships that determine the value of   
outputs (Winston, 2001).  Simulations were conducted using @Risk to account for randomness in 
some variables (Palisade Corporation, 2000).  Probability distribution functions representing 
uncertainty are used to define risk.  Ten thousand iterations were performed successively until 
distributions were adequately filled and simulated results were plausible.   
 
 
Base Case Results 
 
  The base case provides results for comparison under different possible conditions or 
changes in parameters.  The three scenarios are described individually followed by a comparison. 
 
  Market with only conventional products.  In the market with conventional products 
only, pesticide producing firms decide quantity which ultimately determines prices.  Scenario 1 
is illustrated for both the conventional market with one (simulation 1) and two competitors 
(simulation 2) in the conventional pesticide industry.  All farmers who are indifferent between 
purchasing the conventional pesticide and buying nothing are indicated by θ ˆ; therefore, the 
demand for the conventional pesticide is determined by those farmers whose need is greater than 
θ ˆ.  Thus, demand (or, adoption) for the conventional technology is 50% (1 - 0.5) of total HRS 
acres (Table 5).  In simulation 2, competition decreases the price of the conventional technology, 
0 p , from $17.91 to $11.94.  The price decrease results in more farmers purchasing the 
conventional pesticide as indicated by θ ˆ dropping to 0.33.  Thus, demand is 67% (1 - 0.33), of 
total HRS acres.  Individual firm profit,  0 π , in simulation 1 is $136 million and in simulation 2 is  
 
 
Table 5.  Price Impact Model Results – Conventional and GM FRW 
P0          PL  0 π   B π   s0  s1 W 
Sim. Structure --- $ per acre ---
Conv. 
Adopt FRW  Adopt -------------------- $ million ---------------------- 
#1  n0 = 1   n1 =0  17.91    50%   136  68   204 
#2  n0 = 2   n1 =0 11.94    67%    61    121    242 
#3  n0 = 1   n1 =1  11.46  15.06  32%  36% 56  83 28 104  271 
#4  n0 = 2   n1 =1  8.44  12.35  47%  30% 30  57 61 103  281 
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$61 million (simulation 2 includes two firms so total firm profits is $122 million).  Farmer 
surplus,  0 s , is $68 million in simulation 1 and $121 in simulation 2.  Sector welfare, W, of $204 
million in simulation 1 increased to $242 million in simulation 2. 
 
The production efficiency of GM FRW is analogous to the yield loss prevention quality 
of the new GM variety.  In CRD 3 (northeastern North Dakota), the average HRS yield loss due 
to FHB over the period 1993-2000 is 18.3%, and we assume the genetically modified FR wheat 
would provide 100% prevention of the potential losses due to FHB.  Simulations 3 and 4 
correspond to market equilibrium with conventional wheat (being provided by one or two firms) 
and GM FRW (being provided by a single firm owning the trait patent).  The total price of the 
GM plant protection solution is L p ($/acre).  In the market with two products, FRW is adopted by 
the farmers with the highest θ  value or those with  1
~
< <θ θ .  The conventional technology is 
adopted by farmers with a θ  value such that  θ θ θ
~ ˆ < < .  Farmers who decide to use neither form 
of technology have a θ  value of  θ θ ˆ 0 < < .  In simulation 3, GM FRW was adopted by 36% of 
the farmers () 36 . 0 64 . 0 1 = − .  The conventional protection solution was adopted by 32% of the 
farmers, and 32% of the farmers purchased no plant protection.  In simulation 4, the adoption of 
FRW was 30%, conventional technology adoption was 47%, and 23% of the farmers purchased 
no plant protection. 
 
  The agbiotechnology firm sets a license price,  L p , for FRW of $15.06/acre.  The 
availability of FRW results in a price decrease of 36% for the conventional fungicide,  0 p , from 
$17.91 to $11.46.  Also, introduction of GM FRW transfers a majority of firm payoffs from the 
conventional to the agbiotechnology firm.  From simulation 1 to 3, payoffs for the conventional 
firm decrease from $136 million to $56 million (a decrease of 59%) while the payoff to the 
agbiotech firm was $83 million in simulation 3.  Much of farmer surplus shifted to those farmers 
who adopt the GM FRW.  From simulation 1 to 3, conventional farmer surplus decreases from 
$68 million to $28 million, while the introduction of GM FRW resulted in a farmer surplus of 
$104 million to those farmers who adopted the GM FRW technology in simulation 3.  Farmer 
surplus increases because of more product choices.  Sector welfare increased by 32.8% from 
simulations 1 to3. 
 
  Comparing simulations 2 and 4 (when  2 0 = n ), the agbiotechnology firm sets a  L p  of 
$12.35/acre and the price of the conventional fungicide decreases by 30%, from $11.94 to $8.44.  
This lower price allows farmers with a low willingness-to-pay (or low θ ) to purchase the 
conventional fungicide.  For this reason, comparing simulations 3 and 4, adoption of FRW 
decreased while adoption of the conventional fungicide increased.  Introduction of the GM FRW 
results in a shift of the firm payoffs and farmer surpluses.  From simulation 2 to 4, payoffs to the 
conventional firm decreased from $61 million to $30 million, while the agbiotech firm gained a 
payoff of $57 million after introduction of the GM FRW.  Surplus for conventional farmers 
decreased from $121 million to $61 million from simulation 2 to 4, while the surplus to those 
farmers that adopted the GM FRW technology was $103 million in simulation 4. 
 
  Market with conventional and GM Roundup Ready® wheat.  The prospective release of 
Roundup Ready® wheat (RRW) is met by the need for a complementary non-selective herbicide 
(i.e., glyphosate).  In this scenario, one agbiotechnology firm provides the Roundup Ready® 
trait, and also sells a complementary herbicide.  When  2 1 = n , one firm is the agbiotechnology  
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firm and the other sells a competing complementary glyphosate.  Production efficiency for RRW 
is assumed to be the potential yield benefit of RRW over conventional wheat based on various 
field trials, an 11-14% increase over conventional varieties.  Simulations 1 and 2 are shown 
along with simulations 5 and 6 to illustrate key changes (Table 6).   
 
 
Table 6.  Price Impact Model Results – Conventional and RRW 
0 p  
1 p  
L p   0 π   1 π   B π   s0  s1 W 




Adopt  -------------------- $ million ---------------------- 
#1  n0 = 1   n1 = 0 17.90     50%    136      68    204 
#2  n0 = 2  n1 = 0 11.94      67%    61      121    242 
#5  n0 = 1  n1 = 2 11.73 6.95  7.72  33%  34%  58  18  59  29  98  263 
#6  n0 = 2  n1 = 2  8.24  6.24  5.09  36%  31%  29  15  39 57 107  276 
 
 
  Introduction of RRW causes a 34.5% decrease in  0 p  from simulation 1 to 5, from 
$17.90/lb to $11.73/lb.  The agbiotechnology firm sets an equilibrium license price,  L p , of 
$7.72/acre in simulation 5.  From this, 34% of the farmers adopt the RRW-complementary 
herbicide bundle.  Those farmers who adopt the conventional plant protection technology (such 
that  θ θ θ
~ ˆ < < ) are 33% of the total.  Finally, 33% of the farmers adopt no plant protection 
solution.  There is a shift in firm payoffs and farmer surplus post introduction of the GM trait.  
From simulation 1 to 5, the conventional herbicide firm payoff decreased from $136 million to 
$58 million, while the payoff to a glyphosate producing firm was $18 million and the payoff to 
the RRW agbiotech firm was $59 million post introduction of RRW.  Surplus for conventional 
farmers decreased from $68 million to $29 million from simulation 1 to 5, while the surplus to 
the farmers that adopted RRW was $98 million in simulation 5.  Due to the introduction of 
RRW, sector welfare increased by 29% from simulation 1 to simulation 5, from $204 million to 
$263 million. 
 
  Comparing simulations 2 and 6 (when  2 0 = n ), the agbiotechnology firm set  L p  at 
$5.09.  The price of the conventional herbicide,  0 p , decreases by 31% in this case, from 
$11.94/lb in simulation 2 to $8.94/lb in simulation 6.  Farmers benefit from competition and 
product diversity.  Farmer surplus increases from simulation 2 to 6, but it is mostly shifted from 
conventional farmers to those farmers that adopt RRW.  Conventional farmer surplus decreases 
from $121 million to $58 million, while surplus to those farmers who adopt RRW was $107 
million post introduction of RRW.  The payoff to the conventional herbicide producing firm 
decreases from $61 million to $29 million, while the glyphosate producing firm has a payoff of 
$15 million and the RRW agbiotech firm has a payoff of $39 million in simulation 6.  Sector 
welfare increases by 14%, from $242 million to $276 million.   
 
Table 7 summarizes the results of the base case for each scenario in which there is 
competition in the conventional pesticide production industry (i.e., simulations 2, 4, and 6). 
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Conventional Pesticide Price  $11.93/lb  $8.44/lb  $8.24/lb 
Complementary Pesticide Price  NA  NA  $6.24/lb 
License Price/Tech Fee  NA  $12.35/acre  $5.09/acre 
No Product Adoption  33%  23%  23% 
Conventional Adoption  67%  47%  46% 
GM Adoption  NA  30%  31% 
 
 
Variations of Surplus 
 
  The release of a GM trait combined with price decreases of conventional technologies 
result in some farmers adopting a new technology while others continue using the conventional 
technology.  Such interactions allow for farmers with a low level of willingness-to-pay for the 
GM technology to accrue surplus because of the price decreases of the competing conventional 
pesticide associated with the release of the GM trait.  The variations in surplus measure, 
developed by Lemarie and Marette (2003), was used to compare farmer surplus as the market 
shifts from conventional wheat to a market with conventional wheat and GM wheat.   
 
  Farmers with the highest willingness-to-pay for the GM trait (i.e., farmers with the 
highest θ ) shift from adopting the conventional pesticide to adopting the GM solution.  Some 
farmers continue adopting the conventional protection.  Some farmers that did not adopt any 
plant protection when only conventional protection was available may purchase the conventional 
pesticide in the new market because of their low need or willingness-to-pay.  The variations of 
farmer surplus and also changes in firm profits and sector welfare in both market configurations 
are illustrated in Table 8. 
 
 




Simulation  0 → ∆ φ S   0 0→ ∆S   1 0→ ∆S   S ∆   0 0 π ∆ ∗ n   B π π ∆ + ∆ 1   W ∆  
#1 
 
#3 8.84  12.76  41.60  63.20  -80.31  83.20  66.09 
#2 
 
#4 2.46  19.70  20.34  42.50  -60.60  56.50  38.40 
#1 
 
#5 8.10  15.02  36.43  59.55  -77.72  76.92  58.75 
#2 
 
#6 2.72  20.26  20.70  43.68  -63.40  53.39  33.67 
 
 
  The variations of surplus show the changes in surplus for one group of farmers as the 
market moves from conventional to either conventional plus GM FRW or conventional plus 
RRW.  For example, moving from simulation 1 to 3,  0 → ∆ φ S  is the change in surplus of those  
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farmers who purchase no plant protection solution in simulation 1 then purchase technology 
choice 0 (conventional fungicide) in simulation 3.  In simulation 1, 50% of farmers adopt no 
protection solution and 50% adopt the conventional protection solution.  In simulation 3, 36% of 
farmers with the highest θ adopt GM FRW, 32% adopt the conventional fungicide, and 32% 
adopt no protection solution.  This indicates that 18% of farmers moved from purchasing no 
protection in simulation 1 to purchasing the conventional protection in simulation 3 (50%-32%).  
Introducing GM FRW, the surplus for the 18% of total farmers that switched from nothing to 
conventional fungicide protection increased by $8.84 million. 
 
  The surplus to farmers who purchased conventional protection technology in both 
simulations 1 and 3 ( 0 0→ ∆S ) increases by $13 million.  Conventional adoption in simulation 1 
was 50% and in simulation 3 was 32%.  Adoption of the GM FRW was 36% in simulation 3.  
Thus, farmers with the highest willingness-to-pay for the new technology become adopters in 
simulation 3.  This leaves 14% of farmers purchasing conventional fungicide in both simulations.  
Therefore, the increase in surplus to those 14% of farmers is a direct result of the price decrease 
of the conventional fungicide. 
 
  The surplus to farmers who purchase the conventional fungicide in simulation 1 and 
then adopt the GM FRW in simulation 3 ( 1 0→ ∆S ) increases by $42 million.  Adoption of the 
conventional fungicide in simulation 1 was 50% and adoption of the GM FRW was 36% in 
simulation 3.  Those 36% of total farmers with the highest willingness-to-pay for the GM FRW 
variety are the ones who moved from conventional to GM FRW.  So, the change in farmer 
surplus for those 36% of total farmers was an increase of $42 million. 
 
  The  total variation in surplus from simulation 1 to 3 increased by $63 million.  Because 
of the price decrease of the conventional fungicide, the total change in payoff for the 
conventional fungicide producing firms ( 0 0 π ∆ ∗ n ) was a decrease of $80 million from 
simulation 1 to 3.  The total change in payoffs for the fungicide producing firm and the GM 
FRW agbiotech firm ( B π π ∆ + ∆ 1 ) increased by $83 million.  Thus, sector welfare increased by 
$66 million from simulation 1 to 3.  Interpretation of the remaining simulations in Table 8 is 
identical. 
 
  The variation of surplus solidifies the notion that adopters of a new GM wheat trait are 
not the only group to gain surplus.  In fact, from simulation 2 to 4, and from simulation 2 to 6, 
the increase in surplus for farmers who purchase conventional protection in both simulations and 
the increase in surplus for the farmers who move from conventional to GM technology are 
similar.  From simulation 2 to 4,  0 0→ ∆S = $20 million and  1 0→ ∆S = $20 million.  From simulation 
2 to 6,  0 0→ ∆S = $20 million and  1 0→ ∆S = $21 million.  This indicates that farmers who continue to 
use conventional protection post introduction of a GM wheat variety benefit almost equally as 











Market with only Conventional Products 
 
  The price of the technology depends on the number of firms in the conventional 
pesticide production industry.  The number of conventional herbicide producing firms and 
fungicide producing firms in the U.S. are 11 and 4, respectively.  These impacts are shown on 
both price and adoption levels for herbicides (see Figures 6 and 7)
5 and fungicides (see Figures 8 
and 9).  The results are intuitive in that as the number of firms increases, the price of the 
conventional pesticide decreases due to the increase in competition.  As a result of lower prices 
for the technology, adoption rates increase as the number of firms increases. 
 
 
Market with Conventional and GM Fusarium Resistant Wheat 
 
  Number of GM FRW agbiotech firms.  In the base case, it was assumed that only one 
agbiotech firm produced the GM FRW technology because of patent protection and the lack of 
need for complementary pesticides.  A technological innovation is typically granted a patent for 
a number of years, preventing competition in the production of the innovation and allowing 
monopoly pricing by the innovator.  When the patent expires, entry is permitted which creates 
competition.  Sensitivities were performed to illustrate the effects of an expiring patent resulting 
in increased competition among agbiotech firms in the production of GM FRW. 
 
  As the number of GM FRW agbiotech firms increases from 1 to 6, the price of the GM 
FRW technology decreases from $12.35/acre to $4.96/acre while the price of the conventional 
fungicide decreases from $8.44/lb to $3.45/lb (Figure10).  With patent protection for one firm, 
adoption of the conventional variety was 47% while adoption of the GM FRW variety was 30% 
(Figure11).  If the patent expires and three firms produce the GM FRW technology, adoption of 
the conventional variety is 29% and adoption of the GM FRW variety is 56%.  This change in 
adoption levels is the result of the price decrease and an indirect result of the patent expiration.  
Figure 12 shows that increased competition in the production of GM FRW technology yields a 
large surplus increase for producers purchasing that technology, while firms’ revenues gradually 
decline. 
 
  Production efficiency of GM FRW.  The base case assumption was that GM FRW 
completely prevents the possibility of FHB infestation.  Although GM FRW is being tested in 
field trials, results of the production efficiency from those tests have not been released.  
Conventional varieties do provide some protection against FHB, but not 100%.  For those 
reasons, sensitivities were conducted on the level of FHB control of a GM FRW variety, ranging 
from 10% to 100% of the total estimated yield benefit using a scalar on production efficiency of 
the GM FRW variety.  For example, if the variety provided 50% control of FHB, the variety 
would provide the producer with 50% of the GM FRW yield benefit. 
 
  As the efficiency of the GM FRW variety changes from 10% to 100%, the license price 
(or, tech fee) for GM FRW technology increases from $9.32/acre to $12.35/acre.  Over the same 
interval, the price of the conventional fungicide decreases from just under $9/lb to just over $8/lb 
(Figure 13).  Figure 14 illustrates that as the yield benefit of the GM FRW trait increases from 
                                                           
5 All figures referenced in this section are contained in Appendix B at the end of this report.  
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10% to 100%, the adoption level of the GM FRW variety increases from 26% to 30% and the 
adoption level of the conventional protection decreases from 50% to 47%.  Figure 15 shows that 
the increase in efficiency results in large payoff increase for the agbiotech firm producing the 
GM FRW technology.  Farmers purchasing the GM FRW technology also have a small increase 
in surplus. 
 
  Marginal cost of GM FRW technology production.  It was assumed that the marginal 
cost of production of the GM FRW variety was zero for two reasons.  First, a large portion of the 
total cost associated with a GM trait is fixed due to extensive research and development over 
many years.  Second, data do not exist on the value of the marginal cost of production and 
distribution of a GM seed trait.  Marginal cost is not nil and sensitivities were conducted to 
illustrate the impact of increasing marginal cost of production.  The marginal production cost 
remains at nil throughout the sensitivities.  The marginal cost of GM FRW technology 
production was varied from $1 to $7 to demonstrate its effects on prices, adoption, and farmer 
and firm surplus. 
 
  The increase in marginal production cost increases the license price.  As the marginal 
cost of GM FRW production increases from $1 to $7, the license price increases from 
$23.95/acre to $25.48/acre, and the price of the conventional technology increases from 
$22.92/lb to $24.39/lb (Figure 16).  Figure 17 shows that as the marginal production cost of the 
GM FRW technology increases, adoption of GM FRW declines from 28% to 18%, while 
adoption of the conventional technology increases from 48% to 55%.  The change in adoption is 
a direct result of the increase in the license price of GM FRW variety.  Figure 18 illustrates that 
as the marginal production cost of the GM FRW technology increases, profits for the agbiotech 
firm as well as surplus for the farmers purchasing the GM FRW decrease while profits for the 
conventional fungicide producing firm and the farmers purchasing the conventional technology 
increase.  This result coincides with the changes in prices and adoption levels. 
 
 
Market with Conventional and Roundup Ready® Wheat 
 
  Number of RRW agbiotech firms.  In the base case, it was assumed that one firm 
produced the RRW technology and the complementary non-selective glyphosate herbicide, while 
another firm produced only a competitive generic glyphosate herbicide.  An increase in n1 in the 
conventional plus RRW scenario represents an increase in competition in the production of the 
glyphosate herbicide.   
 
  Monsanto has experienced this sequence of events in that it held patents on both 
Roundup® herbicide and Roundup Ready® trait technology.  As the patent on the Roundup® 
herbicide expired, agrochemical firms entered the glyphosate herbicide market to compete with 
Roundup
®.
   For this reason, Monsanto decreased the price of its Roundup® herbicide (Burchett, 
2004), but captures more rents by increasing the tech fee on its Roundup Ready® varieties 
because farmers’ willingness-to-pay for the RR trait + glyphosate bundle did not change.  This 
scenario is represented below. 
 
  As the number of glyphosate producing firms increases from 2 to 9, the price of 
glyphosate herbicide decreases from $6.24/lb to $1.80/lb and the price of conventional herbicides 
decreases from $8.24/lb to $7.13/lb.  Because of the decrease in the price of the glyphosate, the 
agbiotechnology increases the license price from $5.08/acre to $8.00/acre to capture the  
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remaining willingness-to-pay of producers for the RRW + glyphosate herbicide bundle (Figure 
19).  Figure 20 illustrates that as competition in glyphosate production increases from 2 firms to 
9 firms, adoption of the RRW technology increases from 31% to 40% and adoption of the 
conventional protection decreases from 46% to 40%.  This result coincides with Figure 21 in that 
the surplus to the farmers purchasing the conventional technology decreases while the surplus to 
the farmers purchasing the RRW technology increases as competition increases.  The increased 
competition results in lower payoffs for both glyphosate and conventional herbicide producing 
firms, while the agbiotech firm that produces the RRW technology gains profit from the increase 
in the license price (Figure 22). 
 
  Production efficiency of RRW.  This sensitivity uses a multiplier on the yield benefit of 
RRW to simulate a particular variety providing partial or total yield benefit.  This sensitivity was 
conducted to include 10% to 100% of the total RRW yield benefit.  As the level of efficiency 
gained from RRW increases from 10% to 100% of the total RRW yield benefit, the license price 
of the RRW variety increases from $5.23/acre to $6.24/acre and the price of the glyphosate 
herbicide increases from $3.57/lb to $5.08/lb, while the price of the conventional herbicide 
decreases from $8.49/lb to $8.24/lb (Figure23).  Figure 24 illustrates that as RRW efficiency 
increases from 10% to 100%, adoption of RRW increases from 29% to 31%, while adoption of 
the conventional technology decreases from 47% to 46%.  Both types of farmers (conventional 
purchasing and RRW purchasing) do not experience much change in surplus due to the increase 
in efficiency of the RRW variety (Figure 25).  Figure 26 shows that the glyphosate producing 
firm’s payoff and the agbiotech firm’s payoff increase as production efficiency increases.  
Payoffs to the conventional producing firm decreases slightly over the same interval. 
 
  Marginal production cost of glyphosate herbicide.  In the base case, the assumption of 
no marginal production cost of the glyphosate herbicide was used because the value is unknown 
and for purposes of simplicity and the GM FRW scenario, sensitivities were performed.  As the 
marginal production cost of glyphosate increases from $1 to $7, the price for glyphosate also 
increases from $6.86/lb to $10.58/lb (Figure 27).  This increase in the price of glyphosate causes 
the license price (tech fee) of the RRW trait technology to decrease from $4.77/acre to 
$2.92/acre because of the increasing cost of the bundle (RRW trait + glyphosate).  As the price 
of glyphosate increases, so does the price of the conventional herbicide.  As a direct result of the 
increase in the price of the RRW bundle and an indirect result of the increase of marginal 
production costs, adoption of RRW decreases from 29% to 17% and adoption of conventional 
technology increases from 47% to 55% (Figure 28).  Coinciding with this result, surplus to 
farmers purchasing the conventional technology increases while surplus to farmers purchasing 
the RRW technology decreases with an increase in marginal production cost (Figure 29).  Also, 
payoffs to firms involved in the production of the RRW bundle decrease while profits to 
conventional technology producing firms increase (Figure 30). 
 
  Effect of On-Farm Cost Savings.  Using a GM wheat variety, farmers realize a certain 
level of on-farm cost savings.  A survey of hard red spring wheat growers in the United States 
and Canada conducted by Kalaitzandonakes, Suntornpithug, and Phillips (2004) found that 
farmers in the United States estimate a RRW variety would provide approximately $9.70/acre in 
direct cost savings over a conventional variety.  This cost saving is attributable to reduced labor 
cost, application cost, management cost, etc.  The base case assumed that on-farm cost savings 
were nil.  Including on-farm cost savings in the utility to the farmers has the impact of increasing 
their willingness-to-pay for the GM trait. 
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  A cost savings parameter was incorporated into the indirect utility function for growers 
of the RRW variety to determine the impacts on the base case scenario.  The indirect utility 
function for the grower was transformed to include the cost savings parameter such that:  
cs p p a x u L + − − = 1 1 1 1 θ , where cs is the on-farm cost savings.  This was used to derive the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities, which were used to determine equilibrium prices, profits, 
and surpluses.  This sensitivity was compared to simulation 6 in the base case, which represents 
competition in the conventional herbicide producing industry in the market with conventional 
and RRW technologies.  Results are shown in Table 9. 
 
 
Table 9.  Incorporating Farmer Cost Savings to RRW Scenario 
0 p  
1 p  
L p   0 π  
1 π  
B π   0 s  
1 s  
Sim. Structure  ------$ acre-------  Conv Adopt  RRW Adopt  ----------------- $million --------------------  W 
#6  n0 = 2   n1 =2  8.24  6.24  5.09  46%  31%  29  14.15  39  58  107  276 
CS n0 = 2   n1  =0  11.16  15.36  8.63  31%  38% 26 44 93  2  10 202 
 
 
  With non-nil on-farm cost savings, results suggest the agbiotechnology firm and the 
complementary herbicide producing firm raise prices and accrue an increase in adoption levels 
because of the increase in willingness-to-pay of the farmer.  Adoption of RRW in simulation 6 
was 31%, while adoption when cost savings are considered is 38%.  The price of the 
conventional herbicide also increases, which results in lower adoption for the conventional 
technology.  Adoption of the conventional variety was 46% in simulation 6 and 31% in the cost 
savings simulation.  The increase in adoption level of the RRW technology and increase in prices 
for both the conventional and the RRW technologies result in the agbiotech firm and 
complementary herbicide producing firm gaining a portion of the surplus from the farmers.  As 
on-farm cost savings move from zero to $9.70, payoffs for the glyphosate producing firm 
increase from $15 million to $44 million and for the RRW agbiotech firm increase from 
$39million to $93 million.  Over the same interval, surplus of the farmers who purchase the 
conventional technology decreases from $58 million to $2 million and total surplus to the 
farmers who adopt the RRW variety decreases from $107 million to $10 million.  Finally, as a 
result of the inclusion of on-farm cost savings, sector welfare decreases from $276 million to 
$202 million. 
 
  These results indicate that as farmers place a higher value on their on-farm cost savings 
due to RRW trait, the agbiotech firm would increase the price of the royalty (or, tech fee) and the 
complement.  This increase in price of the RRW bundle [RRW trait + complementary 
glyphosate] allows the agbiotech firm to capture the majority of the rents away from the farmer.   
 
 Impacts  of  Uncertainty.  Price levels in each scenario were determined using simulation 
methods in @Risk, which determined a distribution of these values based on the input parameters 
and random variables.  The reported values in each simulation represent the mean value.  Figures 
31-33 illustrate the cumulative probability distribution of the technology prices from simulations 
1, 3, and 5, respectively.  The cumulative probability distribution captures the notion of non-
discrete results of performed simulations.  For example, Figure 31 illustrates that with 50%  
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certainty the price of the conventional technology is below $17.90/lb and with 95% certainty the 






  In hard red spring (HRS) wheat, the two GM traits nearest to commercialization are 
fusarium resistant wheat (FRW) from Syngenta and Roundup Ready® wheat (RRW).  Monsanto 
announced that it has deferred the commercialization of RRW until issues of market acceptance 
are alleviated.  Monsanto acknowledged that it might reconsider its position if another 
agbiotechnology firm enters the GM wheat market. 
 
  Typically, adoption estimates of GM crops examine the cost-benefit of the GM variety 
compared to the conventional variety.  However, release of a GM variety would impact prices of 
competing pesticides used on the conventional varieties, making the conventional variety less 
costly than prior to the GM variety.  The release of RR soybean in 1996 resulted in a 40-50% 
decline in price of two leading conventional soybean herbicides in 1997 and 1998.  Considering 
such price decreases results in lower than expected adoption rates for the GM variety.  This 
causes an increase in surplus for those farmers who adopt the GM variety, as well as those who 
plant the conventional variety.  This also poses major strategic questions for agbiotechnology 
and conventional pesticide firms in their estimates of adoption rates, prices, and profits. 
 
  A Cournot quantity competition model was developed to determine the equilibrium 
quantities of conventional pesticide and agbiotechnology firms.  The Cournot model was used 
because firms that must make production decisions ahead of the selling period, and firms with 
extensive research and development costs are not able to aggressively set prices.  Rather, the 
conventional and agbiotechnology firms determine Nash equilibrium quantities and then 
determine a market clearing price for their respective products.  The agbiotechnology firm 
determined a profit maximizing technology fee ($/acre) for its GM trait.  The market with 
conventional wheat only was compared to the market with conventional and GM wheat varieties 
to determine the price decreases of the conventional pesticide as a result of the GM trait 
introduction.  Changes in farmer surplus, tech firm payoffs, and sector welfare were also 
analyzed. 
 
  This study provides contributions in that it develops a model to predict price changes of 
current technologies due to the introduction of a new competing technology.  The price impact 
model is applied to a contemporary problem in GM trait development of HRS wheat.  Other 
prospective GM traits in wheat are under development and will face similar price impact issues.  
The price impact model can also be applied to different GM traits and crops, as well as any 
problem involving the release of new technology and its effects on the pricing of an incumbent 
competing technology.   
 
  Under the stylized assumption, the results suggest the release of a RR HRS wheat 
variety would result in a price decrease of 31-35% for conventional herbicides.  This price 
decrease allows farmers with a low willingness-to-pay for the GM variety to realize cost savings 
in the production of conventional HRS wheat.  The surplus of farmers continuing to produce a 
conventional variety post-introduction of RR HRS wheat, increased by $13-20 million.  
Assuming market equilibrium quantities of the conventional and RR wheat technologies,  
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adoption rates were determined as 23% for no product adoption, 47% for conventional varieties, 
and 30% for RR wheat adoption. 
 
  Likewise, the release of GM FRW would result in a price decrease of 30-36% for 
conventional fungicides.  Again, this price decrease allows farmers with a low willingness-to-pay 
for the GM FRW variety to benefit from lower fungicide prices.  The surplus to farmers who 
continued to produce conventional varieties, post-introduction of a GM fusarium resistant HRS 
wheat variety, increased by $15-20 million.  Assuming competition in the conventional fungicide 
sector and market equilibrium quantities of the conventional and GM technologies, adoption 
rates were determined to be 23% for no product adoption, 46% for conventional varieties, and 
31% for GM FR wheat adoption.  Introduction of either the RR or GM FR wheat traits improved 
welfare for both growers who adopt the new GM variety and those using the conventional 
variety (due to the price decline), as well as the agbiotechnology firm. 
 
  Using the actual number of firms with conventional herbicides labeled for use on HRS 
wheat in North Dakota (11) and marginal production costs ranging from one to three dollars, 
introduction of RRW would cause a 20-25% price decrease for conventional herbicides.  
Similarly, four firms produce conventional fungicides labeled for the suppression of FHB in 
HRS wheat.  This value, combined with per acre marginal production costs ranging from one to 
three dollars, would more likely cause a 19-22% price decrease for conventional fungicides, post 
introduction of GM FRW. 
 
  As the number of generic glyphosate-producing firms increase, the price of the 
glyphosate would decrease and the agbiotechnology firm would increase the technology fee for 
the RRW trait.  Because RRW involves a bundle of the trait and the glyphosate herbicide, the 
decrease in price of the glyphosate allows the agbiotechnology firm to capture remaining 
willingness-to-pay for the bundle through the technology fee.  This results in lower payoffs to 
conventional herbicide and glyphosate-producing firms, whereas the agbiotechnology firm 
experiences an increase in payoffs.  This is akin to recent announcements by Monsanto that the 
cost of its RR soybean system will not change; however, it also announced that the price of its 
Roundup® Original Max herbicide has been lowered by 25-30% (Burchett, 2004).  Since the 
cost of the RR soybean system is unchanged and the cost of the Roundup® Original Max 
herbicide has decreased, it can be inferred that the technology fee for the RR trait has increased. 
 
  Several implications arise from these results.  First, adoption of a new GM wheat 
variety may not be as high as expected due to likely concurrent price decreases of conventional 
pesticides.  The price decrease leads to a lower production cost of conventional varieties, and 
some farmers who would likely adopt the GM variety, if there were no price decrease, do not 
adopt because of the lower cost of conventional production.  This price decrease must be 
included in the determination of potential adoption rates by agbiotechnology firms in their 
pricing decisions.  Second, the release of a GM wheat variety results in an increase in surplus for 
all types of wheat farmers (GM adopters, conventional pesticide adopters, and no technology 
adopters).  GM adopters benefit because of the release of the GM variety.  Conventional 
pesticide adopters benefit due to the price decreases of the conventional pesticides.  Farmers who 
did not adopt any technology prior to the release of GM wheat may adopt the conventional 
pesticide because of the lower cost.  Third, the release of a GM wheat variety would result in 
slightly lower payoffs for conventional pesticide producing firms but higher payoffs for 
agbiotechnology firms.  Overall, surplus to farmers and conventional and agbiotechnology firms 
increases due to the release of a GM wheat variety.  
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  The results of this study provide important policy contributions, in that all producers of 
hard red spring wheat benefit from the introduction of a GM wheat variety because of price 
decreases of the conventional pesticides.  Thus, agbiotechnology firms are not the only entities to 
benefit from GM wheat introduction.  This is an important issue to convey when addressing 




Besanko, D., Dranove, D., Shanley, M., and Schaefer, S. (2004). Economics of Strategy (3rd 
ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.  
 
Blackshaw, R. E., and Harker, K. N. (2002). Selective weed control with glyphosate in 
glyphosate-resistant wheat (triticum aestivum). Weed Technology, 16, 885-892.  
Burchett, A. (2004, October). Monsanto slashes Roundup® Original price. Farm Journal, 128, 
Special Features Page.  
 
Carpenter, J., and Gianessi, L. (2003). Trends in pesticide use since the introduction of 
genetically engineered crops. In N. Kalaitzandonakes (Ed.), The Economic and 
Environmental Impacts of Agbiotech (pp. 43-62). New York: Kluwer.  
 
Fernandez-Cornejo, J., and Hendricks, C. (2003, July 27-30). Off-farm Work and the Economic 
Impact of Adopting Herbicide-Tolerant Soybeans. Paper presented at the meeting of the 
American Agricultural Economics Association, Montreal, Canada.  
 
Fulton, M., and Giannakas, K. (2001). Agricultural biotechnology and industry structure. 
AgBioForum, 4(2), 137-151.  
 
Gianessi, L. P., and Carpenter, J. E. (2000, April). Agricultural Biotechnology:  Benefits of 
Transgenic Soybeans. Washington, DC: National Center for Food and Agricultural 
Policy.  
 
Kalaitzandonakes, N., Suntornpithug, P., and Phillips, P. W.B. (2004, July 8-11). Roundup 
Ready® WheatiIn Canada and the US:  A Survey and Analysis ff Potential Farmer 
Adoption. Paper presented at the meeting of the 8th ICABR International Conference on 
Agbiotechnology:  International Trade and Domestic Production, Ravello, Italy.  
 
Lapan, H. E., and Moschini, G. (2000). Incomplete adoption of a superior innovation. 
Economica, 67, 525-542.  
 
Lemarie, S., and Marette, S. (2003). Substitution and complementarities in the biotechnology and 
pesticide markets:  A theoretical framework. In N. Kalaitzandonakes (Ed.), The 
Economic and Environmental Impacts of Agbiotech (pp. 287-306). New York: Kluwer.  
 
McDougall, J., and Phillips, M. (2003). The impact of agricultural biotechnology on the 
conventional agrochemical market. In N. Kalaitzandonakes (Ed.), The Economic and 
Environmental Impacts of Agbiotech (pp. 19-41). New York: Kluwer.  
 
McMullen, M. P., and Bradley, C. A. (2004, January). 2004 Field Crop Fungicide Guide (PP-
622). Fargo: North Dakota State University Extension Service.  
 
McMullen, M. P., and Stack, R. W. (1999, December). Fusarium Head Blight (Scab) of Small 
Grains (Small Grains Publication PP804). Fargo: North Dakota State University 
Extension Service.  
    
  33
Monsanto. (2004, May 10). Monsanto to Realign Research Portfolio, Development of Roundup 
Ready® Wheat Deferred. Retrieved June 4, 2004, from 
http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/layout/media/04/05-10-04.asp 
 
Mussa, M., and Rosen, S. (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic Theory, 
18, 301-317.  
 
Nadolnyak, D. A., and Sheldon, I. M. (2001, August 5-8). Simulating the Effects of Adoption of 
Genetically Modified Soybeans in the U.S. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Agricultural Economics Association, Chicago.  
 
Nganje, W. E., Johnson, D. D., Wilson, W. W., Leistritz, F. L., Bangsund, D. A., and Tiapo, N. 
M. (2001, October). Economic Impacts of Fusarium Head Blight in Wheat and Barley:  
1998-2000 (Agribusiness and Applied Economics Report No. 464). Fargo: North Dakota 
State University, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics.  
 
Palisade Corporation. (2000). @Risk 4.0 – Student Version. Software. New York. 
 
Pates, M. (2004, May 17). Area farmers to launch pro-biotech effort. Agweek, pp. 26-27.  
 
Pratt, S. (2004, May 13). Monsanto shelves GM wheat. The Western Producer, p. 1.  
 
Qaim, M., and de Janvry, A. (2002, July 28-31). Bt Cotton in Argentina:  Analyzing Adoption 
and Farmers' Willingness to Pay. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Agricultural Economics Association, Long Beach, CA. 
 
Symeonidis, G. (2003). Comparing Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly 
with product R and D. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21, 39-55.  
 
Syngenta. (2004). Tomorrow's Products by Syngenta. Retrieved March 24, 2004, from 
http://www.syngenta.com/en/products_services/tomprod.aspx 
 
United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. (n.d.). 
Information System for Biotech (ISB). Retrieved June 3, 2004, from 
http://www.nbiap.vt.edu 
 
United States Department of Agriculture National Agricultural Statistics Service. (2004). Quick 
Stats: Agricultural Statistics Data Base. Retrieved October 18, 2004, from 
http://www.nass.usda.gov/QuickStats 
 
Wilson, W. W., Janzen, E. L., Dahl, B. L., and Wachenheim, C. J. (2003, January). Issues in 
Development and Adoption of Genetically Modified (GM) Wheats (Agribusiness and 
Applied Economics Report No. 509). Fargo: North Dakota State University, Department 
of Agribusiness and Applied Economics.  
 
Winston, W. L. (2001). Simulation modeling using @RISK:  Updated for Version 4. Pacific
  Grove, CA: Duxbury. 
  
  34
Zollinger, R. K. (2004, January). 2004 North Dakota Weed Control Guide (W-253). Fargo: 
North Dakota State University Extension Service.   
  35
 
Appendix A:  Resolution of Cournot-Nash Equilibria 
 
The complete mathematical derivation of the equilibrium are derived in this appendix. 
Market Equilibrium with One Product 
A farmer indifferent between buying the conventional product and buying nothing is identified 
by the preference parameter θ ˆ.  This implies that  0 ˆ






= θ  (A.1) 
The demand function,  () ( ) θ ˆ 1 0 0 0 − = Na p Q , can be rewritten as: 












Na Q  (A.2) 
and the inverse demand function can then be given by: 
  () () 0 0 2
0
0
0 0 Q Na
Na
x
Q p − =  (A.3) 
The profit function for seller k,  ( ) ( ) k k q c Q p 0 0 0 0 0 − = π , is written as: 
  () k k q c Q Na
Na
x









− − = π  (A.4) 










j k q q Q  (A.5) 
with  k q0 being the quantity of seller k and  j q0  being the quantity of seller j, for all 





























− − = ∑
−
=
π  (A.6) 
To determine the profit maximizing level of  k q0 , the first-order condition is:  
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Na q  (A.8) 
and under a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium, all sellers adopt the same strategy.  So here, 
j ok q q 0 =  for any j and then 
*
0k q  becomes: 
























k k q n
x
c Na
Na q  (A.9) 
Since all sellers adopt the same strategy, simplifying this expression will yield the equilibrium 
quantity for each seller: 
  ( )
() 1 0 0





c a x Na
q  (A.10) 
The optimal market equilibrium total quantity is then  0
*
0 0 n q Q =  or: 
  ( )
() 1 0 0





n c a x Na
Q  (A.11) 
This total quantity can then be substituted into the inverse demand function: 















0 0 n x




Q p  (A.12) 
and simplifying this expression gives the equilibrium market price: 
  () () 1 0 0







n c a x
Q p  (A.13) 
With  () 0
*
0 Q p  and 
*
0 q , the optimal firm profit can be written as: 
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() 1 1 0 0
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π  (A.14)  
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The farmers’ surplus from indirect utility is: 
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0 0 s n W + = π  (A.20) 
Detailed Resolution of Market Equilibrium with Two Products 
 Because  θ
~
refers to a farmer who is indifferent between the type 0 and the type 1 
products, it is implied that for this farmer,  1 0 u u = .  From this equality, θ
~
 can be determined: 
  L p p a x p a x − − = − 1 1 1 0 0 0
~ ~
θ θ , (A.21) 
 
0 1
0 0 1 1 ~
x x
p a p p a L
−
− +
= θ  (A.22) 
Recall the demand functions for product type 0 and product type 1:  
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Substituting the derived expressions for θ ˆ and θ
~
 into the demand functions and assuming a 
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  To determine the inverse demand functions, both demand functions can be solved a 
price.  Those two price functions can be set equal to each other and then solved for the other 




0 p p = .  
Solving  () L p p p Q , , 1 0 0  for  0 p  gives: 
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=
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L  (A.25) 
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0 1 1 1 1 1
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1 0 1 1 1 1
0 a Na
x Q x Q p Na p Na x Na x Na
p
L  (A.26) 
Equating 
0
0 p  and 
1
0 p  and solving for  ( ) L p Q Q p , , 1 0 1  yields: 





⎡ + − +
− = 2
1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 , ,
a Na
x Q a x a Na x Q a p a Na
p Q Q p L  (A.27) 
Simplifying and rearranging this expression,  ( ) L p Q Q p , , 1 0 1  is then given by: 
























1 0 1 1 , ,  (A.28) 
Similar derivation from the demand functions using 
0
1 p  and 
1
1 p  to determine  () L p Q Q p , , 1 0 0  
yields:  
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Using  () L p Q Q p , , 1 0 0  in the profit function for seller k of product type 0 displays: 

















































π  (A.30) 
Recall, since all firms adopt same strategy,  1 1 1 n q Q = .  Taking the partial derivative of  k 0 π  with 
respect to  k q0  to determine the profit maximizing level of  k q0  is given by: 


























































Recalling that under a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium,  j ok q q 0 =  for any j, 
() 1 ,..., 3 , 2 , 1 0 − = n j , the first-order condition for profit maximization by the  0 n  sellers is then 
simplified to: 


































Using  () L p Q Q p , , 1 0 1  in the profit function for seller r of product type 1 displays: 































































− ⋅ − =
∑
−
= π  (A.33) 
Recall, since all firms adopt same strategy,  0 0 0 n q Q = .  Taking the partial derivative of  r 1 π  with 
respect to  r q1  to determine the profit maximizing level of  r q1  is given by:  
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Recalling that under a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium,  s r q q 1 1 =  for any s, 
() 1 ,..., 3 , 2 , 1 1 − = n s , the first-order condition for profit maximization by the  1 n  sellers is then 
simplified to: 





































Simultaneously solving the two first-order conditions: 
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1 n q Q = .  Substituting 
*
0 Q  and 
*
1 Q  into the inverse demand functions and 
solving for 
*
0 p  and 
*
1 p  gives: 
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() () ()
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0 p  and 
*
0 q  into the profit function for the seller of product type 0 will give the 
resulting equilibrium profit level for that firm:  
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L π  (A.40) 
Likewise, the equilibrium optimal profit for a seller of product type 1 can be determined by 
substituting 
*
1 p  and 
*
1 q  into the profit function and simplifying: 
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2
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2
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1 1 π π + = .  Profit 
maximization for the biotechnology seller with respect to  L p  gives the equilibrium license price 
*
L p : 
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Then, using the equilibrium license price 
*
L p , the surplus of the farmers purchasing type 0 and 
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The expression for 
*
1 s  is much more complex.  Integrating 
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Since it is assumed that one of the  1 n  firms is a biotech firm, total welfare is defined by: 








0 0 1 s s n n W B + + + − + = π π π  (A.46) 
 
Two Products:  No Complementary Pesticide Needed with GM Seed 
  Seed that has been genetically modified to express insect resistance or disease resistance 
does not require a complementary pesticide to complete the protection bundle.  The GM seed is a 
sufficient protection solution.  In this case, no product type 1 is necessary and therefore the  1 n  
firm(s) are all biotech sellers of GM seed.  A farmer purchasing product 1 in this case will pay 
only the license price  L p  rather than the license price plus the price of the complementary 







L p x u
p a x u
1 1
0 0 0 0
θ
θ
 (A.47)  
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The procedure for solving for this Cournot-Nash equilibrium is identical to the two product case 
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Like in the previous case with two products, the firms choose quantity to maximize profit in the 
symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium.  The first-order conditions then are: 
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Simultaneously solving the first-order conditions for equilibrium quantities is then given by:  
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Substituting 
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0 p  and 
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0 q  into  0 π  gives: 
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Substituting 
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1 q  into  B π  gives: 
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Figure 33.  Cumulative Probability Distribution of Prices in Simulation 5. 
   